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This paper examines the marriage payment system of the Maneo, a 
small population of hunter/foragers in the mountains and on the coast 
of central Seram. These exchanges are pivotal in determining the way 
principles of social organization are put into actual practice. Over the 
last thirty years, however, the quantity of payments—particularly of 
16th- and 17th-century porcelain—has declined dramatically. Analysis 
of the effects of change sheds light on the meaning of marriage and 
payments. It also permits investigation of the role of marriage in shap-
ing Maneo history.  
The Maneo are a sedentary population of hunters, foragers, and some-
time horticulturalists living in the mountains and on the south coast of 
central Seram in central Maluku. Located to the east of the Maneo are 
Seti-speaking communities; Manusela-speaking communities (of which 
the Maneo are one) are scattered to the west. There are roughly 500 Ma-
neo residing in one of four mountain villages and in scattered small 
dwellings in the forest, and another 500 divided between two recently 
established coastal villages. They are nominally organized into more or 
less exogamous corporate units I will refer to (uncritically) as clans. Clan 
members collectively own hunting and gardening territories; they also 
possess rights to certain myths and genealogies. Generally, persons are 
recruited patrilineally. However, each individual possesses limited rights 
to material and nonmaterial properties belonging to his or her maternal 
(or paternal) clan. In addition, offspring of same-sex parents who are 
siblings refer to each other categorically as siblings, regardless of their 
clan affiliation. The whole region—Maneo, Manusela, and Seti—is 
loosely organized by interlocking kinship and marriage ties, and by 
shared history, including formal alliances and enmities. 
 I first travelled to the region for two months in 1989. Based on data 
gathered on that trip and from surveying the ethnographies of nearby 
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groups (e.g., Ellen 1978, McKinnon 1991, Valeri 1980, van Wouden 
1968), I designed a proposal for dissertation research on changes and 
continuities in the Maneo marriage exchange system and on the relation-
ship between marriage and social organization more generally. Since 
then, my wife and I have completed fifteen months of study (from June 
1992 through August 1993) and plan to return shortly for several more 
months of research. In this paper, I wish to describe tentative efforts to 
assemble disparate field data into a coherent framework for analysis.  
 The first question nonspecialists ask is: Why marriage? Marriage, and 
the attendant set of exchanges in Maneo, create and animate a variety of 
important social relationships predicated upon enduring reciprocal 
obligations backed up by moral force. Clan recruitment is largely de-
termined by these exchanges. If payments from the husband’s side 
(hahapina) to the wife’s side (hahamana) are complete, then offspring 
generally affiliate patrilaterally. If not, then one or more of the children 
join their maternal clan and reside with maternal grandparents and un-
cles. The consequences of affiliating patrilaterally or matrilaterally are 
unclear. Clans are exclusive, yet each confers approximately the same 
privileges (the ideology of clan hierarchy notwithstanding.) The area of 
activity most affected by marriage exchanges is, of course, marriage it-
self. Payments help to delineate the range of eligible and noneligible 
marriage partners. For example, payments may differentiate a matrilat-
eral cross-cousin marriage—the preferred marriage pattern—from an 
incestuous union, or the reverse. A person may consider a marriage in-
cestuous if he is asked to contribute to the marriage of a classifictory 
sibling or son and, at the same time, has a prior claim to property on the 
bride’s side by virtue of a contribution to the bride’s father in the previ-
ous generation. In other words, this prior exchange—denoting the same-
sex sibling relationship of parents—would emphasize the sibling status 
of the prospective couple and de-emphasize their cross-cousin status. 
Had this parental sibling relationship not been activated by a marriage 
payment contribution (e.g., had it been a distant kin tie or had it simply 
been forgotten), and assuming the couple were members of different 
clans (usually necessary), then, in all likelihood, the marriage would 
have been allowed. Thus, given the potential for overlapping and con-
tradictory affinal and consanguineal relationships, the record of actual 
marriage exchanges clarify ambiguous social statuses by emphasizing 
particular ties over others.  
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 The centrality of marriage in Maneo makes it a useful set of practices 
and beliefs to examine in order to assess broader social and historical 
processes. This is particularly so since I had heard on my first trip in 
1989 that marriage payments themselves are changing. According to an 
informant from the coast, cash (up to US$1500) is replacing traditional 
valuables—16th- and 17th-century porcelain, brass gongs, and iron gun 
barrels—still in circulation in the mountains. If so (and for the purposes 
of the grant proposals I was writing at the time, I assumed it was), then I 
could test to see whether changes in the content of marriage payments is 
resulting in changes in the form of the exchanges—in the manner in 
which payments are mobilized, distributed, and exchanged. Variation in 
exchange patterns would, in turn, indicate broader morphological 
changes in the structure of Maneo society. I assumed also that marriage 
makes manifest a system of gender- and age-based inequalities (Collier 
1988). Thus, I proposed, the precipitating cause of this transformation 
would lie with the perceived vulnerability of the existing structure of 
authority. That is, elders would be changing the form of marriage pay-
ments as a strategy to preserve their privileged position in society threat-
ened by of the loss of traditional valuables (due to sale and breakage.) 
Support for this argument would come from showing that the sociology 
of cash exchanges in marriage negotiations mirrors that established by 
the exchange of traditional valuables, with respect to elder control over 
the distribution and allocation of marriage gifts. Evidence would also 
emerge from the interpretation of interviews and from analysis of statis-
tics over time on the various kinds of marriages contracted, including 
arranged matches, “love” marriages, and elopements. I expected the 
monetization of marriage exchanges on the coast to provide the oppor-
tunity for historical and comparative analysis (between coastal and 
mountain Maneo). However, when I returned to the field in 1992, I real-
ized that these assumptions were unfounded and more problematic than 
anticipated.  
 A review of two relatively typical case studies illustrates some of 
complexities. The first marriage occured in the fifties in the mountains.  
In 1955, M’s mother arranged a marriage for her son with a woman, F, 
from a non-Maneo clan from a non-Maneo village (Kabohari) with pre-
vious affinal ties to her clan. (Some property was distributed at the time 
this marriage was arranged.) She selected F because she thought she was 
intelligent and hard working—a good match for her son. However, she 
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had two more important objectives. She wanted to re-establish this par-
ticular affinal tie and she wanted to prevent M from marrying another 
woman. This other woman, whom M wished to marry, had just given 
birth. His mother was outraged. “You’re like rain falling indiscrimi-
nately,” she said. “But you’re human and I gave birth to you, so you must 
obey me.” M’s father was silent, concerned that his son might poison 
himself if forced to marry another woman. His mother insisted, however. 
She even slashed M’s leg with a knife. At the time, M knew only that a 
match had been arranged, he did not yet know the identity of his 
prospective bride. On passing through F’s village he was invited to eat at 
her parent’s house. A seat was left open next to her. The hosts said, 
“Don’t run. Here she is.” He spent one night with her and returned home 
the next day saying he would be right back. Instead he fled to the forest. 
In the meantime, his mother, father, and sister’s husband went to F’s vil-
lage and returned with her to Maneo. Realizing there were no alternatives 
(and unwilling to risk eloping with his girlfriend), M conceded and 
moved back in with his parents and new wife. In 1957, property was ex-
changed for this marriage on the first of two formal occasions called ha-
hapina. Supposedly, 75 pieces of property—mostly porcelain and gongs 
(one third of which consisted of “named” pieces, the most highly 
prized)—were distributed from his side to his bride’s. These items came 
from his parents and directly from his sister who had just married. (The 
bride’s side gave cloth and arm bracelets and hosted the party in return.) 
Later, as promised, a second ceremony was held after the marriage of an-
other sister and just after the death of M’s parents. The 25 additional 
pieces of property in this distribution came from paternal uncles.  
This second marriage took place in one of the coastal villages in 1993. 
F, who had just finished SMP (Junior High School), had two suitors, H 
and another young man from a nearby (non-Maneo) coastal village. Her 
father and mother preferred H. While H is a very likeable fellow, their 
preference reflected other considerations as well. Both candidates were 
poor, but H, with numerous relatives to call on, appeared to have the bet-
ter chance of obtaining property with which to marry F (literally “to 
compensate her parents for the cost of raising her”). In addition, F’s 
younger brother would need property from her marriage if he hopes to 
marry properly—that is, reside patrilocally and keep his childen. He has 
no other sisters. (Their parents never mentioned a “need” or “desire” to 
renew an affinal alliance.) For her part, F seemed indifferent to her fam-
ily’s interests. She continued both relationships. Then, immediately after 
F’s father chased the other suitor out the window of her bedroom (fleeing 
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in such haste he left his sandals), H promptly departed for the mountains 
to solicit property from his mother and maternal uncles. (He has no bio-
logical sisters and his father—an only child—is dead.) H gave F’s par-
ents a gong and immediately moved in. The marriage was made public 
when the couple and her father began to process sago together. F’s father 
has asked H for two named pieces of property, one called pinalaelaesa, 
which used to be relatively common in Maneo, and another, a kotalalin, 
which was more common in Manusela and Kabohari. He asked for the 
latter to “replace” the kotalalin he had given his own brother-in-law 
thirty years earlier. Recognizing the scarcity of porcelain, he told H he 
would accept cash instead (roughly US$150 per object). Unfortunately, 
most of the property that H’s mother had stored or had access to from her 
second marriage (and from the marriages of her sisters) had been given to 
H’s older brother when he had married. Presently, the young couple 
reside with F’s parents on the coast in a state of probationary marriage 
called kapia or kawin piara. Since marrying, H has given some cash 
(US$10) and four more pieces of property (none of which are the named 
pieces his father-in-law had asked for).  
Several conclusions can be drawn from these and other case studies col-
lected so far. First, marriage does not generate obvious social inequalities 
along the lines of gender and age that I had proposed. Unlike the first 
case study, children typically cooperate with their parents (even in 
arranged matches), and older women usually take an active role in pro-
moting (or obstructing) the marriages of their children. Second, there are 
no significant regional differences in Maneo marriage practices despite 
the fact that 40 kilometers of uninhabited rugged terrain separates the 
relatively isolated mountain villages from the coastal communities. 
Mountain Maneo come down to the coast to help harvest cloves; coastal 
people venture to the mountains to eat durian and jackfruit, look for 
birds, and gather gaharu (an aromatic resin sold and processed for in-
cense). Most families have close relatives in both regions whom young 
men visit when they need marriage valuables. Third, the historic changes 
in marriage practices are less dramatic than anticipated. To be sure, there 
are differences, some of which will provide a basis for comparison. For 
example, the decline in the availability of marriage payments has meant 
that far more of the offspring of younger couples join their maternal 
clans than in the past. Yet marriage practices since the 1940s have been 
remarkably consistent. As in the past, young men obtain gifts from par-
ents and sisters, and parents, for their part, still attempt (though with less 
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success, I believe) to influence the marriage decisions of their children. 
Porcelain and other valuables are used in contemporary marriages de-
spite the fact that quantities are dwindling. Cash is accepted—the wife-
givers (hahamana) often ask their wife-takers (hahapina) for money—
yet most persons are unwilling to receive cash in lieu of porcelain (F’s 
father in the second case study being one exception). Cash and traditional 
marriage valuables mean different things and their meanings reflect 
differences in their respective exchange values. Nevertheless, shifts in 
meanings and changes in practices may well occur by the time the next 
generation marries. One indication of change comes from the fact that up 
until the 1960s marriages were almost all celebrated with a hahapina 
ceremony. This ceremony—which includes dancing, singing, and 
feasting—is hosted by the bride’s side and is intended, symbolically, to 
challenge the guests. The guests, in response, display their marriage gifts. 
Now, however, this celebration rarely occurs, and when wealth is 
distributed it is done so clandestinely. If the experience of mobilizing and 
distributing marriage payments (and of marrying itself) affects young 
couples differently from the way the experience affected their parents a 
generation earlier, then, I suspect, changes in marriage practices and in 
the meaning of those practices will become even more apparent in the 
next generation.  
 What can one say about the data in light of the need to reformulate 
the original research design? One obvious impression emerging from the 
case studies is that the circumstances surrounding each marriage are 
unique. Circumstances influencing marriage outcomes include family 
composition (the ratio of same-sex to cross-sex siblings, the birth order 
and marital status of family members), the history of prior marriages and 
exchanges, and the clan status of various parties involved. As in the 
marriages described above, these factors matter. In the first case study, M 
had enormous resources from sisters who had married as well as from 
being the first of his parents’ sons to marry. For that reason, perhaps, his 
mother wished to, and was able to arrange a prestigious match. In the 
second case study, H has far less wealth yet greater autonomy in his 
marriage choices. These differences are not directly related to the loca-
tion of their respective marriages nor to the era the marriages took place. 
Differences in marriage outcomes, instead, reflect a certain lattitude in 
the interpretation and application of marriage procedures. One man, for 
example, insists that his daughters’ marriages be completed with five 
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prized pieces of porcelain each—an unusually high demand. He recalls 
the amount of property contributed for his own marriage as justification. 
If his affines are not able to come up with the requisite amount (and none 
so far have), then each of the daughters’ families will have to reside 
matrilocally and all the grandchildren will devolve matrilineally. Most 
parents are less demanding, typically “pulling” just one child to the 
mother’s side if payments are incomplete. Another elder, disgusted by 
the marriage of his sister to his own brother-in-law (a violation of the 
principle that one should not directly receive the gifts one gives), did not 
press claims to valuables or to the couple’s offspring. Yet this same 
elder, along with his wife, still feel an obligation to fulfill this brother-in-
law’s continued demands for property or children. They even consider 
transferring a child from their eldest daughter’s family.  
 Differences in marriage strategies and outcomes are the result of 
competing interests and values. There are no explicit standards to cite in 
mediating marriage disputes. Moreover, there are no courts—only in the 
most volatile of cases will elders convene to attempt to settle a matter. (It 
is recognized that parties, not necessarily individuals, enter into mar-
riages on their own accord. Thus, they are free to withdraw or negotiate 
as they see fit.) Instead, standards of appropriateness guide participants 
in marriage negotiations. A good marriage, one conforming to the 
matrilateral cross-cousin pattern and publicly affirmed by the exchange 
of valuables, generates prestige. This prospect in tandam with the threat 
of opprobrium (or worse) should, ideally, curb base desires that might 
otherwise lead to bad marriages. (Note that bad marriages are not syn-
onymous with love marriages.) Thus, I was informed, sister-exchange 
marriages (described above) did not occur in the past because people 
were too ashamed. Likewise, people said, perpetrators of the more seri-
ous offense, marrying “incestuously” (of which there were at least four 
recognized cases at the time of our fieldwork) would have been killed in 
the past. These remarks may be meant to assuage our (the field worker’s) 
anticipated moral condemnation; they may also be an attempt to mollify 
a collective shame by recalling that at least there was a time in which 
marriages conformed to an appropriate standard. Yet, the comments of 
informants may also reflect a depth of historical truth. Prestigious 
marriages confirm long-standing alliances between subsegments of 
different clans. These alliances, I believe, are declining in importance 
and declining as a source of prestige. The spread of Christianity 
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(beginning early this century) and the growing influence of the state 
(particularly since the end of the RMS separatist movement), has dimin-
ished threats of interclan raids and obviated at least some of the need for 
contracting political alliances. Prestige may now be pursued in earnest 
through other avenues made possible by the expansion of the market 
economy (i.e., through prospects of earning cash and purchasing goods, 
particularly on the coast.) Without some of the conditions that once lent 
urgency to the renewel of marriage alliances, marriage may no longer be 
the area of strategic concern it once was. Thus, parental involvement in 
the marital decisions of their children—an ongoing phenomenon—may 
reflect personal sentiments, such as concern for the “fitness” of the pro-
spective spouse and consideration of marriage-payment demands. Indi-
viduals may be relatively free to contract their own “love” marriages 
(suka dengan suka) provided they do not violate principles of incest and 
sister-exchange. Further collection and analysis of oral histories and 
marriage case studies should shed light on these and other issues.  
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